11 accepted papers
We study the optimal design of a self-financing event, a problem that requires balancing the recruitment of costly, positive-value participants with revenue-generating agents who may impose negative values on the event. We introduce a novel two-sided mechanism design framework with plus agents equip
We study the problem of designing replication-proof bandit mechanisms when agents strategically register or replicate their own arms to maximize their payoff. Specifically, we consider Bayesian agents who only know the distribution from which their own arms' mean rewards are sampled, unlike the orig…
Motivated by applications such as online labor markets we consider a variant of the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem where we have a collection of arms representing strategic agents with different performance characteristics. The platform (principal) chooses an agent in each round to complete a…
We introduce the tokenized linear bandit (TLB) and multi-armed bandit (TMAB), variants of linear and stochastic multi-armed bandit problems inspired by LLM decoding and alignment. In these problems, at each round $t \in [T]$, a user submits a query (context), and the decision maker (DM) sequentially…
In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual…
We consider the setting of repeated fair division between two players, denoted Alice and Bob, with private valuations over a cake. In each round, a new cake arrives, which is identical to the ones in previous rounds. Alice cuts the cake at a point of her choice, while Bob chooses the left piece o…
The online bipartite matching problem, extensively studied in the literature, deals with the allocation of online arriving vertices (items) to a predetermined set of offline vertices (agents). However, little attention has been given to the concept of class fairness, where agents are categorized int…
We present a study on a repeated delegated choice problem, which is the first to consider an online learning variant of Kleinberg and Kleinberg, EC'18. In this model, a principal interacts repeatedly with an agent who possesses an exogenous set of solutions to search for efficient ones. Each solutio…
We present an oracle-efficient relaxation for the adversarial contextual bandits problem, where the contexts are sequentially drawn i.i.d from a known distribution and the cost sequence is chosen by an online adversary. Our algorithm has a regret bound of $O(T^{\frac{2}{3}}(K\log(|\Pi|))^{\fra…
We study social learning dynamics motivated by reviews on online platforms. The agents collectively follow a simple multi-armed bandit protocol, but each agent acts myopically, without regards to exploration. We allow a wide range of myopic behaviors that are consistent with (parameterized) confiden…
We consider a multi-armed bandit problem in which a set of arms is registered by each agent, and the agent receives reward when its arm is selected. An agent might strategically submit more arms with replications, which can bring more reward by abusing the bandit algorithm’s exploration-exploitation…