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Kevin Klyman

10 accepted papers

2026

Who Evaluates AI's Social Impacts? Mapping Coverage and Gaps in First and Third Party Evaluations

ICML 2026poster

Foundation models are increasingly central to high-stakes AI systems, and governance frameworks now depend on evaluations to assess their risks and capabilities. Although general capability evaluations are widespread, social impact assessments covering bias, fairness, privacy, environmental costs, a…

Cited by 0SourceScholar
2025

AIR-BENCH 2024: A Safety Benchmark based on Regulation and Policies Specified Risk Categories

ICLR 2025spotlight

Foundation models (FMs) provide societal benefits but also amplify risks. Governments, companies, and researchers have proposed regulatory frameworks, acceptable use policies, and safety benchmarks in response. However, existing public benchmarks often define safety categories based on previous lite…

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2025

Bridging the Data Provenance Gap Across Text, Speech, and Video

ICLR 2025poster

Progress in AI is driven largely by the scale and quality of training data. Despite this, there is a deficit of empirical analysis examining the attributes of well-established datasets beyond text. In this work we conduct the largest and first-of-its-kind longitudinal audit across modalities --- pop…

Cited by 1SourcePDFScholar
2025

Machine Unlearning Doesn't Do What You Think: Lessons for Generative AI Policy and Research

NeurIPS 2025oral

"Machine unlearning" is a popular proposed solution for mitigating the existence of content in an AI model that is problematic for legal or moral reasons, including privacy, copyright, safety, and more. For example, unlearning is often invoked as a solution for removing the effects of specific infor…

Cited by 0SourceScholar
2025

Position: In-House Evaluation Is Not Enough. Towards Robust Third-Party Evaluation and Flaw Disclosure for General-Purpose AI

ICML 2025spotlight

The widespread deployment of general-purpose AI (GPAI) systems introduces significant new risks. Yet the infrastructure, practices, and norms for reporting flaws in GPAI systems remain seriously underdeveloped, lagging far behind more established fields like software security. Based on a collaborati…

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2025

Position: Language model developers should report train-test overlap

ICML 2025spotlight

Language models are extensively evaluated, but correctly interpreting evaluation results requires knowledge of train-test overlap, which refers to the extent to which the language model is trained on the very data it is being tested on. The public currently lacks adequate information about train-tes…

Cited by 6SourcePDFScholar
2024

Consent in Crisis: The Rapid Decline of the AI Data Commons

NeurIPS 2024poster

General-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) systems are built on massive swathes of public web data, assembled into corpora such as C4, RefinedWeb, and Dolma. To our knowledge, we conduct the first, large-scale, longitudinal audit of the consent protocols for the web domains underlying AI training…

Cited by 36SourceScholar
2024

Position: A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming

ICML 2024oral

Independent evaluation and red teaming are critical for identifying the risks posed by generative AI systems. However, the terms of service and enforcement strategies used by prominent AI companies to deter model misuse have disincentives on good faith safety evaluations. This causes some researcher…

Cited by 5SourcePDFScholar
2024

Position: On the Societal Impact of Open Foundation Models

ICML 2024oral

Foundation models are powerful technologies: how they are released publicly directly shapes their societal impact. In this position paper, we focus on *open* foundation models, defined here as those with broadly available model weights (e.g., Llama 3, Stable Diffusion XL). We identify five distincti…

Cited by 4SourcePDFScholar