26 accepted papers
Prompting has become a dominant paradigm for adapting large language models (LLMs). While discrete (textual) prompts are widely used for their interpretability, soft (parameter) prompts have recently gained traction in APIs. This is because they can encode information from more training samples whil…
It is now common to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) by having humans manually vote to evaluate model outputs, in contrast to typical benchmarks that evaluate knowledge or skill at some particular task. Chatbot Arena, the most popular benchmark of this type, ranks models by asking users to sele…
State-of-the-art membership inference attacks (MIAs) typically require training many reference models, making it difficult to scale these attacks to large pre-trained language models (LLMs). As a result, prior research has either relied on weaker attacks that avoid training references (e.g., fine-tu…
An important question today is whether a given text was used to train a large language model (LLM). A completion test is often employed: check if the LLM completes a sufficiently complex text. This, however, requires a ground-truth definition of membership; most commonly, it is defined as a member b…
"Machine unlearning" is a popular proposed solution for mitigating the existence of content in an AI model that is problematic for legal or moral reasons, including privacy, copyright, safety, and more. For example, unlearning is often invoked as a solution for removing the effects of specific infor…
Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to memorizing training data, raising concerns about the potential extraction of sensitive information at generation time. Discoverable extraction is the most common method for measuring this issue: split a training example into a prefix and suffix, then p…
We study the problem of computing the privacy parameters for DP machine learning when using privacy amplification via random batching and noise correlated across rounds via a correlation matrix $\textbf{C}$ (i.e., the matrix mechanism). Past work on this problem either only applied to banded $\textb…
Current techniques for privacy auditing of large language models (LLMs) have limited efficacy---they rely on basic approaches to generate canaries which leads to weak membership inference attacks that in turn give loose lower bounds on the empirical privacy leakage. We develop canaries that are far…
Due to the sensitive nature of personally identifiable information (PII), its owners may have the authority to control its inclusion or request its removal from large-language model (LLM) training. Beyond this, PII may be added or removed from training datasets due to evolving dataset curation techn…
Memorization in language models is typically treated as a homogenous phenomenon, neglecting the specifics of the memorized data. We instead model memorization as the effect of a set of complex factors that describe each sample and relate it to the model and corpus. To build intuition around these fa…
Large language models are prone to *memorizing* some of their training data. Memorized (and possibly sensitive) samples can then be extracted at generation time by adversarial or benign users. There is hope that *model alignment*---a standard training process that tunes a model to harmlessly follow…
Scaling laws have emerged as important components of large language model (LLM) training as they can predict performance gains through scale, and provide guidance on important hyper-parameter choices that would otherwise be expensive. LLMs also rely on large, high-quality training datasets, like tho…
We propose a simple heuristic privacy analysis of noisy clipped stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) in the setting where only the last iterate is released and the intermediate iterates remain hidden. Namely, our heuristic assumes a linear structure for the model. We show experimentally that our he…
Differential privacy (DP) offers a theoretical upper bound on the potential privacy leakage of an algorithm, while empirical auditing establishes a practical lower bound. Auditing techniques exist for DP training algorithms. However machine learning can also be made private at inference. We propose…
Differentially private learning algorithms inject noise into the learning process. While the most common private learning algorithm, DP-SGD, adds independent Gaussian noise in each iteration, recent work on matrix factorization mechanisms has shown empirically that introducing correlations in the no…
Privacy amplification exploits randomness in data selection to provide tighter differential privacy (DP) guarantees. This analysis is key to DP-SGD's success in machine learning (ML), but, is not readily applicable to the newer state-of-the-art (SOTA) algorithms. This is because these algorithms, kn…
When large language models are trained on private data, it can be a \textit{significant} privacy risk for them to memorize and regurgitate sensitive information. In this work, we propose a new \emph{practical} data extraction attack that we call ``neural phishing''. This attack enables an adversary…
Text written by humans makes up the vast majority of the data used to pre-train and fine-tune large language models (LLMs). Many sources of this data—like code, forum posts, personal websites, and books—are easily attributed to one or a few “users”. In this paper, we ask if it is possible to infer i…
Matrix factorization (MF) mechanisms for differential privacy (DP) have substantially improved the state-of-the-art in privacy-utility-computation tradeoffs for ML applications in a variety of scenarios, but in both the centralized and federated settings there remain instances where either MF cannot…
Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts…
We introduce new differentially private (DP) mechanisms for gradient-based machine learning (ML) with multiple passes (epochs) over a dataset, substantially improving the achievable privacy-utility-computation tradeoffs. We formalize the problem of DP mechanisms for adaptive streams with multiple pa…
We propose new techniques for reducing communication in private federated learning without the need for setting or tuning compression rates. Our on-the-fly methods automatically adjust the compression rate based on the error induced during training, while maintaining provable privacy guarantees thro…
Collaborative machine learning (ML) is widely used to enable institutions to learn better models from distributed data. While collaborative approaches to learning intuitively protect user data, they remain vulnerable to either the server, the clients, or both, deviating from the protocol. Indeed, be…
Model distillation is frequently proposed as a technique to reduce the privacy leakage of machine learning. These empirical privacy defenses rely on the intuition that distilled ``student'' models protect the privacy of training data, as they only interact with this data indirectly through a ``teach…
Machine learning benefits from large training datasets, which may not always be possible to collect by any single entity, especially when using privacy-sensitive data. In many contexts, such as healthcare and finance, separate parties may wish to collaborate and learn from each other's data but are…
Membership inference is one of the simplest privacy threats faced by machine learning models that are trained on private sensitive data. In this attack, an adversary infers whether a particular point was used to train the model, or not, by observing the model’s predictions. Whereas current attack me…