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Saverio Bolognani

4 accepted papers

2023

How Bad is Selfish Driving? Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Urban Driving Games

RA-L 2023

We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most efficient equilibrium (in term of social cost) is often imprac

Cited by 6Source ↗Scholar ↗
2022

Factorization of Dynamic Games over Spatio-Temporal Resources

IROS 2022poster

Dynamic games feature a state-space complexity that scales superlinearly with the number of players. This makes this class of games often intractable even for a handful of players. We introduce the factorization process of dynamic games as a transformation leveraging the independence of players at e…

Cited by 7Source ↗Scholar ↗
2022

Posetal Games: Efficiency, Existence, and Refinement of Equilibria in Games With Prioritized Metrics

RA-L 2022

Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a partially ordered set of metrics. This allows one to combine hie

Cited by 13Source ↗Scholar ↗
2021

Urban Driving Games With Lexicographic Preferences and Socially Efficient Nash Equilibria

RA-L 2021

We describe Urban Driving Games (UDGs) as a particular class of differential games that model the interactions and incentives of the urban driving task. The drivers possess a “communal” interest, such as not colliding with each other, but are also self-interested in fulfilling traffic rules and pers

Cited by 26Source ↗Scholar ↗