← Search

Saverio Bolognani

4 accepted papers

2023

How Bad is Selfish Driving? Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Urban Driving Games

RA-L 2023

We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most efficient equilibrium (in term of social cost) is often imprac

Cited by 5SourceScholar
2022

Factorization of Dynamic Games over Spatio-Temporal Resources

IROS 2022poster

Dynamic games feature a state-space complexity that scales superlinearly with the number of players. This makes this class of games often intractable even for a handful of players. We introduce the factorization process of dynamic games as a transformation leveraging the independence of players at e…

Cited by 7SourceScholar
2022

Posetal Games: Efficiency, Existence, and Refinement of Equilibria in Games With Prioritized Metrics

RA-L 2022

Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a partially ordered set of metrics. This allows one to combine hie

Cited by 13SourceScholar
2021

Urban Driving Games With Lexicographic Preferences and Socially Efficient Nash Equilibria

RA-L 2021

We describe Urban Driving Games (UDGs) as a particular class of differential games that model the interactions and incentives of the urban driving task. The drivers possess a “communal” interest, such as not colliding with each other, but are also self-interested in fulfilling traffic rules and pers

Cited by 26SourceScholar