5 accepted papers
We consider a number of questions related to tradeoffs between reward and regret in repeated gameplay between two agents. To facilitate this, we introduce a notion of generalized equilibrium which allows for asymmetric regret constraints, and yields polytopes of feasible values for each agent and p…
When an Agent visits a platform recommending a menu of content to select from, their choice of item depends not only on immutable preferences, but also on their prior engagements with the platform. The Recommender's primary objective is typically to encourage content consumption which optimizes some…
We provide a differentially private algorithm for producing synthetic data simultaneously useful for multiple tasks: marginal queries and multitask machine learning (ML). A key innovation in our algorithm is the ability to directly handle numerical features, in contrast to a number of related prior…
We propose, implement, and evaluate a new algo-rithm for releasing answers to very large numbersof statistical queries likek-way marginals, sub-ject to differential privacy. Our algorithm makesadaptive use of a continuous relaxation of thePro-jection Mechanism, which answers queries on theprivate da…
We consider the problem of simultaneous learning in stochastic games with many players in the finite-horizon setting. While the typical target solution for a stochastic game is a Nash equilibrium, this is intractable with many players. We instead focus on variants of