NeurIPS 2025poster0 citations

Efficient Last-Iterate Convergence in Solving Extensive-Form Games

Linjian Meng, Tianpei Yang, Youzhi Zhang, Zhenxing Ge, Shangdong Yang, Tianyu Ding, Wenbin Li, Bo An

Abstract

To establish last-iterate convergence for Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) of extensive-form games (EFGs), recent studies reformulate learning an NE of the original EFG as learning the NEs of a sequence of (perturbed) regularized EFGs. Hence, proving last-iterate convergence in solving the original EFG reduces to proving last-iterate convergence in solving (perturbed) regularized EFGs. However, these studies only establish last-iterate convergence for Online Mirror Descent (OMD)-based CFR algorithms instead of Regret Matching (RM)-based CFR algorithms in solving perturbed regularized EFGs, resulting in a poor empirical convergence rate, as RM-based CFR algorithms typically outperform OMD-based CFR algorithms. In addition, as solving multiple perturbed regularized EFGs is required, fine-tuning across multiple perturbed regularized EFGs is infeasible, making parameter-free algorithms highly desirable. This paper show that CFR$^+$, a classical parameter-free RM-based CFR algorithm, achieves last-iterate convergence in learning an NE of perturbed regularized EFGs. This is the first parameter-free last-iterate convergence for RM-based CFR algorithms in perturbed regularized EFGs. Leveraging CFR$^+$ to solve perturbed regularized EFGs, we get Reward Transformation CFR$^+$ (RTCFR$^+$). Importantly, we extend prior work on the parameter-free property of CFR$^+$, enhancing its stability, which is vital for the empirical convergence of RTCFR$^+$. Experiments show that RTCFR$^+$ exhibits a significantly faster empirical convergence rate than existing algorithms that achieve theoretical last-iterate convergence. Interestingly, RTCFR$^+$ show performance no worse than average-iterate convergence CFR algorithms. It is the first last-iterate convergence algorithm to achieve such performance. Our code is available at https://github.com/menglinjian/NeurIPS-2025-RTCFR.

Counterfactual Regret MinimizationExtensive-Form GamesLast-Iterate Convergence
BibTeX
@inproceedings{
meng2025efficient,
title={Efficient Last-Iterate Convergence in Solving Extensive-Form Games},
author={Linjian Meng and Tianpei Yang and Youzhi Zhang and Zhenxing Ge and Shangdong Yang and Tianyu Ding and Wenbin Li and Bo An and Yang Gao},
booktitle={The Thirty-ninth Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems},
year={2025},
url={https://openreview.net/forum?id=JzWtqd9CGJ}
}
Efficient Last-Iterate Convergence in Solving Extensive-Form Games · NeurIPS 2025