9 accepted papers
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms are widely used to compute a Nash equilibrium (NE) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information extensive-form games (IIGs). Among them, Predictive CFR+ (PCFR+) is particularly powerful, achieving an exceptionally fast empirical convergence rate vi
Regret Matching (RM) and its variants are widely employed to learn a Nash equilibrium (NE) in large-scale games. However, most existing research only establishes a theoretical convergence rate of $O(1/\sqrt{T})$ for these algorithms in learning an NE. Recent studies have shown that smooth RM$^+$ var…
Urban Network Security Games (UNSGs), which model the strategic allocation of limited security resources on city road networks, are critical for urban safety. However, finding a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in large-scale UNSGs is challenging due to their massive and combinatorial action spaces. One common
To establish last-iterate convergence for Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) of extensive-form games (EFGs), recent studies reformulate learning an NE of the original EFG as learning the NEs of a sequence of (perturbed) regularized EFGs. Hence, pr…
Regret Matching$^+$ (RM$^+$) variants are widely used to build superhuman Poker AIs, yet few studies investigate their last-iterate convergence in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE). Although their last-iterate convergence is established for games satisfying the Minty Variational Inequality (MVI), no…
Self-play methods have demonstrated remarkable success in enhancing model capabilities across various domains. In the context of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), self-play not only boosts Large Language Model (LLM) performance but also overcomes the limitations of traditional Bradl…
Nash equilibrium (NE) plays an important role in game theory. How to efficiently compute an NE in NFGs is challenging due to its complexity and non-convex optimization property. Machine Learning (ML), the cornerstone of modern artificial intelligence, has demonstrated remarkable empirical performanc…
Opponent exploitation is an important task for players to exploit the weaknesses of others in games. Existing approaches mainly focus on balancing between exploitation and exploitability but are often vulnerable to modeling errors and deceptive adversaries. To address this problem, our paper offers…
One of the most popular methods for learning Nash equilibrium (NE) in large-scale imperfect information extensive-form games (IIEFGs) is the neural variants of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR). CFR is a special case of Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL). At each iteration, the neural varia…