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Zhenxing Ge

7 accepted papers

2025

Efficient Last-Iterate Convergence in Solving Extensive-Form Games

NeurIPS 2025poster

To establish last-iterate convergence for Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithms in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) of extensive-form games (EFGs), recent studies reformulate learning an NE of the original EFG as learning the NEs of a sequence of (perturbed) regularized EFGs. Hence, pr…

Cited by 0SourcecodeScholar
2025

Improving Reward Models with Proximal Policy Exploration for Preference-Based Reinforcement Learning

NeurIPS 2025poster

Reinforcement learning (RL) heavily depends on well-designed reward functions, which are often biased and difficult to design for complex behaviors. Preference-based RL (PbRL) addresses this by learning reward models from human feedback, but its practicality is constrained by a critical dilemma: wh…

Cited by 0SourceScholar
2025

Last-Iterate Convergence of Smooth Regret Matching$^+$ Variants in Learning Nash Equilibria

NeurIPS 2025poster

Regret Matching$^+$ (RM$^+$) variants are widely used to build superhuman Poker AIs, yet few studies investigate their last-iterate convergence in learning a Nash equilibrium (NE). Although their last-iterate convergence is established for games satisfying the Minty Variational Inequality (MVI), no…

Cited by 0SourcecodeScholar
2024

Safe and Robust Subgame Exploitation in Imperfect Information Games

ICML 2024poster

Opponent exploitation is an important task for players to exploit the weaknesses of others in games. Existing approaches mainly focus on balancing between exploitation and exploitability but are often vulnerable to modeling errors and deceptive adversaries. To address this problem, our paper offers…

Cited by 2SourcePDFScholar
2023

An Efficient Deep Reinforcement Learning Algorithm for Solving Imperfect Information Extensive-Form Games

AAAI 2023technical

One of the most popular methods for learning Nash equilibrium (NE) in large-scale imperfect information extensive-form games (IIEFGs) is the neural variants of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR). CFR is a special case of Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL). At each iteration, the neural varia…