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Jieming Mao

10 accepted papers

2025

Differentially Private Space-Efficient Algorithms for Counting Distinct Elements in the Turnstile Model

ICML 2025poster

The *turnstile* continual release model of differential privacy captures scenarios where a privacy-preserving real-time analysis is sought for a dataset evolving through additions and deletions. In typical applications of real-time data analysis, both the length of the stream $T$ and the size of t…

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2025

Retraining with Predicted Hard Labels Provably Increases Model Accuracy

ICML 2025poster

The performance of a model trained with noisy labels is often improved by simply *retraining* the model with its *own predicted hard labels* (i.e., $1$/$0$ labels). Yet, a detailed theoretical characterization of this phenomenon is lacking. In this paper, we theoretically analyze retraining in a lin…

Cited by 2SourcePDFScholar
2024

Autobidder's Dilemma: Why More Sophisticated Autobidders Lead to Worse Auction Efficiency

NeurIPS 2024poster

The recent increasing adoption of autobidding has inspired the growing interest in analyzing the performance of classic mechanism with value-maximizing autobidders both theoretically and empirically. It is known that optimal welfare can be obtained in first-price auctions if autobidders are restrict…

Cited by 0SourcePDFScholar
2024

Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World

NeurIPS 2024poster

We study the price of anarchy of first-price auctions in the autobidding world, where bidders can be either utility maximizers (i.e., traditional bidders) or value maximizers (i.e., autobidders). We show that with autobidders only, the price of anarchy of first-price auctions is $1/2$, and with bot…

Cited by 31SourcePDFScholar
2021

Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World

NeurIPS 2021poster

In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve prices, however, usually do not help improve total welfare of the auctioneer and the bidders. In this paper, we fo…

Cited by 64SourcePDFScholar
2020

Smoothly Bounding User Contributions in Differential Privacy

NeurIPS 2020poster

A differentially private algorithm guarantees that the input of a single user won’t significantly change the output distribution of the algorithm. When a user contributes more data points, more information can be collected to improve the algorithm’s performance. But at the same time, more noise migh…

Cited by 17SourcePDFScholar
2019

Differentially Private Fair Learning

ICML 2019oral

Motivated by settings in which predictive models may be required to be non-discriminatory with respect to certain attributes (such as race), but even collecting the sensitive attribute may be forbidden or restricted, we initiate the study of fair learning under the constraint of differential privacy…

Cited by 202SourcePDFScholar