18 accepted papers
Transformers have been established as the most popular backbones in sequence modeling, mainly due to their effectiveness in in-context retrieval tasks and the ability to learn at scale. Their quadratic memory and time complexity, however, bound their applicability in longer sequences and so has moti…
Transformers have been established as the de-facto backbones for most recent advances in sequence modeling, mainly due to their growing memory capacity that scales with the context length. While plausible for retrieval tasks, it causes quadratic complexity and so has motivated recent studies to expl…
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) with deep test-time memorization modules, such as Titans and TTT, represent a promising, linearly-scaling paradigm distinct from Transformers. While these expressive models do not yet match the peak performance of state-of-the-art Transformers, their potential has be…
Fine-tuning language models (LMs) with the standard Adam optimizer often demands excessive memory, limiting accessibility. The ``in-place'' version of Stochastic Gradient Descent (IP-SGD) and Memory-Efficient Zeroth-order Optimizer (MeZO) have been proposed as solutions to improve memory efficiency.…
Automated bidding to optimize online advertising with various constraints, e.g. ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI constraints. While prior work has addressed truthful auctions or…
Modern foundation models are trained on diverse datasets to enhance generalization across tasks and domains. A central challenge in this process is determining how to effectively mix and sample data from multiple sources. This naturally leads to a multi-task learning (MTL) perspective. While prior w…
We study the problem of procurement auctions, in which an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of the services is measured through some submodular function that is known to the auctioneer. Our goal is to design computationally efficie…
The recent increasing adoption of autobidding has inspired the growing interest in analyzing the performance of classic mechanism with value-maximizing autobidders both theoretically and empirically. It is known that optimal welfare can be obtained in first-price auctions if autobidders are restrict…
We study the price of anarchy of first-price auctions in the autobidding world, where bidders can be either utility maximizers (i.e., traditional bidders) or value maximizers (i.e., autobidders). We show that with autobidders only, the price of anarchy of first-price auctions is $1/2$, and with bot…
In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while sati…
We study posted price auctions and dynamic prior-independent mechanisms for (ROI-constrained) value maximizers. In contrast to classic (quasi-linear) utility maximizers, these agents aim to maximize their total value subject to a minimum ratio of value per unit of payment made. When personalized pos…
We study prior-independent dynamic auction design with production costs for a value-maximizing buyer, a paradigm that is becoming prevalent recently following the development of automatic bidding algorithms in advertising platforms. In contrast to a utility-maximizing buyer, who maximizes the differ…
Online advertisements are primarily sold via repeated auctions with reserve prices. In this paper, we study how to set reserves to boost revenue based on the historical bids of strategic buyers, while controlling the impact of such a policy on the incentive compatibility of the repeated auctions. Ad…
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve prices, however, usually do not help improve total welfare of the auctioneer and the bidders. In this paper, we fo…
Motivated by the repeated sale of online ads via auctions, optimal pricing in repeated auctions has attracted a large body of research. While dynamic mechanisms offer powerful techniques to improve on both revenue and efficiency by optimizing auctions across different items, their reliance on exact…
Dynamic mechanisms offer powerful techniques to improve on both revenue and efficiency by linking sequential auctions using state information, but these techniques rely on exact distributional information of the buyers’ valuations (present and future), which limits their use in learning settings. In…
We study the problem of how to repeatedly sell to a buyer running a no-regret, mean-based algorithm. Previous work [Braverman et al., 2018] shows that it is possible to design effective mechanisms in such a setting that extract almost all of the economic surplus, but these mechanisms require the buy…
How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under some mild assumptions, the player can always guarantee himself a utility of at least what he would get in a Stackelberg equilibrium. When the no-…