10 accepted papers
We investigate auction mechanisms for AI-generated content, focusing on applications like ad creative generation. In our model, agents' preferences over stochastically generated content are encoded as large language models (LLMs). We propose an auction format that operates on a token-by-token basis,
We study the problem of procurement auctions, in which an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of the services is measured through some submodular function that is known to the auctioneer. Our goal is to design computationally efficie…
We provide an algorithm with regret $O(C d \log \log T)$ for contextual pricing with $C$ corrupted rounds, improving over the previous bound of $O(d^3 C \log^2(T))$ of Krishnamurthy et al. The result is based on a reduction that calls the uncorrupted algorithm as a black-box, unlike the previous app…
In this paper, we investigate the question of whether no-swap-regret dynamics have stronger convergence properties in repeated games than regular no-external-regret dynamics. We prove that in almost all symmetric zero-sum games under symmetric initializations of the agents, no-swap-regret dynamics i…
We consider the following variant of contextual linear bandits motivated by routing applications in navigational engines and recommendation systems. We wish to learn a hidden $d$-dimensional value $w^*$. Every round, we are presented with a subset $\mathcal{X}_t \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ of possible…
Product Design is an important problem in marketing research where a firm tries to learn what features of a product are more valuable to consumers. We study this problem from the viewpoint of online learning: a firm repeatedly interacts with a buyer by choosing a product configuration as well as…
In the Learning to Price setting, a seller posts prices over time with the goal of maximizing revenue while learning the buyer’s valuation. This problem is very well understood when values are stationary (fixed or iid). Here we study the problem where the buyer’s value is a moving target, i.e., they…
We study "adversarial scaling", a multi-armed bandit model where rewards have a stochastic and an adversarial component. Our model captures display advertising where the "click-through-rate" can be decomposed to a (fixed across time) arm-quality component and a non-stochastic user-relevance componen…
The problem of market clearing is to set a price for an item such that quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. In this work, we cast the problem of predicting clearing prices into a learning framework and use the resulting models to perform revenue optimization in auctions and markets with conte…
We present a deterministic nearly-linear time algorithm for approximating any point inside a convex polytope with a sparse convex combination of the polytope’s vertices. Our result provides a constructive proof for the Approximate Carathéodory Problem, which states that any point inside a polytope c…