21 accepted papers
Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) commonly adopts centralized training with decentralized execution, where value-factorization methods enforce the individual-global-maximum (IGM) principle so that decentralized greedy actions recover the team-optimal joint action. However, the re…
Learning stationary policies in infinite-horizon general-sum Markov games (MGs) remains a fundamental open problem in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). While stationary strategies are preferred for their practicality, computing stationary forms of classic game-theoretic equilibria is comput…
Standard multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms are vulnerable to sim-to-real gaps. To address this, distributionally robust Markov games (RMGs) have been proposed to enhance robustness in MARL by optimizing the worst-case performance when game dynamics shift within a prescribed uncert…
We consider the problem of learning to exploit learning algorithms through repeated interactions in games. Specifically, we focus on the case of repeated two player, finite-action games, in which an optimizer aims to steer a no-regret learner to a Stackelberg equilibrium without knowledge of its pay…
Driven by inherent uncertainty and the sim-to-real gap, robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to improve resilience against the complexity and variability in agent-environment sequential interactions. Despite the existence of a large number of RL benchmarks, there is a lack of standardized benchm…
A significant roadblock to the development of principled multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms is the fact that desired solution concepts like Nash equilibria may be intractable to compute. We show how one can overcome this obstacle by introducing concepts from behavioral economics in…
We study the convergence behavior of a generalized Frank-Wolfe algorithm in constrained (stochastic) monotone variational inequality (MVI) problems. In recent years, there have been numerous efforts to design algorithms for solving constrained MVI problems due to their connections with optimization,…
The robust $\phi$-regularized Markov Decision Process (RRMDP) framework focuses on designing control policies that are robust against parameter uncertainties due to mismatches between the simulator (nominal) model and real-world settings. This work makes *two* important contributions. First, we prop…
To address the challenges of sim-to-real gap and sample efficiency in reinforcement learning (RL), this work studies distributionally robust Markov decision processes (RMDPs) --- optimize the worst-case performance when the deployed environment is within an uncertainty set around some nominal MDP. D…
To overcome the sim-to-real gap in reinforcement learning (RL), learned policies must maintain robustness against environmental uncertainties. While robust RL has been widely studied in single-agent regimes, in multi-agent environments, the problem remains understudied---despite the fact that the pr…
The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the model class one optimizes over—and the more data one has access to—the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real-world scenarios, they inevitably face s…
In this work, we study two-player zero-sum stochastic games and develop a variant of the smoothed best-response learning dynamics that combines independent learning dynamics for matrix games with the minimax value iteration for stochastic games. The resulting learning dynamics are payoff-based, conv…
We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an…
We propose a novel framework for analyzing the dynamics of distribution shift in real-world systems that captures the feedback loop between learning algorithms and the distributions on which they are deployed. Prior work largely models feedback-induced distribution shift as adversarial or via an ove…
We study the problem of online learning in competitive settings in the context of two-sided matching markets. In particular, one side of the market, the agents, must learn about their preferences over the other side, the firms, through repeated interaction while competing with other agents for succe…
Min-max optimization is emerging as a key framework for analyzing problems of robustness to strategically and adversarially generated data. We propose the random reshuffling-based gradient-free Optimistic Gradient Descent-Ascent algorithm for solving convex-concave min-max problems with finite sum s…
We study gradient descent-ascent learning dynamics with timescale separation ($\tau$-GDA) in unconstrained continuous action zero-sum games where the minimizing player faces a nonconvex optimization problem and the maximizing player optimizes a Polyak-Lojasiewicz (PL) or strongly-concave (SC) object…
As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the game by deploying a model, and the strategic agents "follow"…
We present a novel approach to control design for nonlinear systems which leverages model-free policy optimization techniques to learn a linearizing controller for a physical plant with unknown dynamics. Feedback linearization is a technique from nonlinear control which renders the input-output dyna…
Thompson sampling for multi-armed bandit problems is known to enjoy favorable performance in both theory and practice. However, its wider deployment is restricted due to a significant computational limitation: the need for samples from posterior distributions at every iteration. In practice, this li…
Considering a class of gradient-based multi-agent learning algorithms in non-cooperative settings, we provide convergence guarantees to a neighborhood of a stable Nash equilibrium. In particular, we consider continuous games where agents learn in 1) deterministic settings with oracle access to their…